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Abstract
The paper introduces, compares and contrasts formal models of source reliability pro-
posed in the epistemology literature, in particular the prominent models of Bovens
and Hartmann (Bayesian epistemology, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003) and
Olsson (Episteme 8(02):127–143, 2011). All are Bayesian models seeking to pro-
vide normative guidance, yet they differ subtly in assumptions and resulting behavior.
Models are evaluated both on conceptual grounds and through simulations, and the
relationship between models is clarified. The simulations both show surprising sim-
ilarities and highlight relevant differences between these models. Most importantly,
however, our evaluations reveal that important normative concerns arguably remain
unresolved. The philosophical implications of this for testimony are discussed.
Keywords Source reliability · Bayes · Testimony
1 Introduction
Imagine someone browsing their social media, and encountering a remote acquain-
tance endorsing the claim that vaccination of children causes autism. Let us assume
that this reader, Anna, previously had a belief (or ‘credence’) in the opposite, namely
that vaccination does not have this side effect. Given that belief, it seems reason-
able that Anna lower her subjective reliability estimate (or epistemic ‘trust’1) for this
1 In the formal epistemology literature, ‘trust’ is often stipulated to mean subjective source reliability. We
adopt this usage for convenience, but point out that there are alternative explications of epistemic trust in
the philosophical literature (cf. Lackey 2011; Wilholt 2013).
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source. However, Anna’s belief in the truth of the proposition at stake (the vaccination
claim) should also be revised in light of the new testimonial evidence; in particular, it
should be revised upwards by Anna, the focal agent, if she previously considered the
source to be highly reliable.
The basic intuition, here, is that we are rationally required to update both our
belief and our trust in a source based on a given report if the source’s reliability has
not been externally provided. This revision of trust in a source and credence in a
proposition must be based on prior subjective estimates of both variables, as neither
of them are known with certainty.2 At least prima facie, given these intuitions, such an
epistemic strategy seems rational. Moreover, recent experimental evidence suggests
that lay people do, in fact, adopt something like this strategy in simple, scenario-based
experimental tasks (Collins et al. 2018; Collins and Hahn 2019).
It should thus come as no surprise that multiple authors both within the formal
epistemology literature (e.g., Olsson 2011; Bovens and Hartmann 2003) and in adja-
cent fields such as cognitive and developmental psychology (Shafto et al. 2012), have
provided Bayesian formalizations of such a strategy. In all cases, these formaliza-
tions have served to elucidate fundamental issues (both normative and descriptive)
with respect to testimony. Though these formalizations all conceptually implement
the same basic strategy of joint estimation of hypothesis and source reliability, they
differ in formal detail. This paper’s purpose is to review, analyze and compare promi-
nent formal models setting them against other models for dealing with less than fully
reliable sources and the underlying problem of how to estimate source reliability.
Taking a step back, the problem is the following: determining how an agent, con-
fronted with one or more reports from a source of information such as a witness,
scientific expert or personal acquaintance, should revise
(1) Their credence in a hypothesis H the report is relevant for and
(2) Their estimation of the source’s reliability, in particular, as it pertains to the
trustworthiness of further reports from the same source.
In anticipation of formalization, a more stylized description of this problem sug-
gests itself: imagine a task used by decades of psychological research on belief revision
(Phillips and Edwards 1966). In front of you are two urns, one containing predomi-
nantly blue chips, the other predominantly red chips. One of these urns is selected,
and your task is to work out which urn this is on the basis of successive draws from
the chosen urn (with replacement after each draw). In the classic task, you as a par-
ticipant are told the respective proportions of red and blue balls, and the experimenter
is interested in how closely your belief revision matches the prescriptions of Bayes’
rule given those likelihoods.
But now, imagine a further difficulty: the composition of the urn is not exactly
known. In other words, you don’t know the true diagnosticity of each red or blue ball
that you receive. Furthermore, you also need to maintain the possibility that you could
2 Further examples might be reading in an internet blog that particles move faster than the speed of light at
CERN, or someone telling us that the US did not land on the moon; as these are contingent empirical facts,
we cannot be entirely certain of their falsity. Hence, it seems reasonable that we update both our beliefs
and, simultaneously, our epistemic trust in the report’s source.
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systematically mistake red for blue balls and vice versa. This is the belief revision
problem for an agent faced with unknown source reliability.
This problem could arise with any real-world source. Objectively, measurement
instruments may not be fully reliable, and the reliability of those measurement instru-
ment may not be known. It may even be that the scale ends of a measurement instrument
have been mixed up (resulting in full or partial anti-reliability), say, such that a read-
ing of ‘hot’ is produced when it is cold, and vice versa. Even where well-intentioned,
communicators sometimes get things wrong, and we may have little or nothing to go
by in order to estimate the probability that what a source says is, in fact, true. It is, of
course, reasonable to assume that, on average, what other people say is more likely
to be true than not, because human communication would simply not be worthwhile
if this were not the case. But it is often impossible to know how likely this is in a
specific case, either because we do not know the source from previous interactions, or
we do not know anything about their expertise with respect to the particular claim at
issue. This is the fundamental fallibility of testimony that has dogged epistemological
concern about this important influence on our everyday beliefs (see, e.g., Coady 1992).
From a philosophical point of view, source reliability is a key problem of social
epistemology. Models of source reliability offer a more precise formulation of the
problem of testimony (cf. Bovens and Hartmann 2003). Such models may be used to
explore fundamental intuitions about testimonial evidence, such as the role of coher-
ence (Olsson 2005; Bovens and Hartmann 2003). They can also be used to identify
conditions under which being credulous is an effective or reasonable strategy, and
when it is not (e.g., Zollman 2015; Hahn et al. 2018b). Such models may also offer
more fundamental explanations about bootstrapping reliability and its limitations (cf.
Elga 2007). Furthermore, formal model also apply to the discussion on how to deal
with expert testimony as a lay person (cf. Goldman 2001; Hahn et al. 2012), and deter-
mine the conditions of successful lay evaluation of expert witnesses (e.g., Hahn et al.
2009; Harris et al. 2013, 2012, 2016; Fenton et al. 2013).
Formal models of source reliability have also been used for agent-based modelling
within formal and social epistemology. Models of source reliability may be used to
replace or supplement simpler agent models in representations of peer disagreement
(Lehrer 1976; Douven 2010), and they have been at the heart of agent-based simu-
lations investigating norms of assertion (Olsson and Vallinder 2013), the impact of
over-confidence (Vallinder and Olsson 2014), group polarization (Olsson 2013; Hahn
et al. 2018), the impact the structure of social networks on the accuracy of beliefs
(Hahn et al. 2018a), or the impact of communication on the informedness of voters
(Hahn et al. 2019). Agent-based models of belief or opinion dynamics are complex
systems, and it is crucial to understand the individual-level behavior of the agent that
the societal model employs.
In short, formal models of source reliability serve a number of research goals, and
there is a host of issues that cannot be understood fully without a detailed understanding
of these models. To this end, the paper examines the two most prominent Bayesian
models of source reliability from the formal epistemology literature, the models of
Olsson (2011) and Bovens and Hartmann (2003, Ch. 4) respectively. It describes
the models and their basic properties, setting them against other Bayesian attempts
to capture the fallibility of testimony. It then evaluates them both conceptually and
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Fig. 1 Bayes net for a single
witness report (REP) on a
hypothesis (H) with reliability
(REL)
through large-scale simulation. These results are used to assess the claim that these
models provide adequate normative guidance on source reliability.
The paper proceeds as follows: First, we present the dimensions of comparison
for models of source reliability. We then proceed to detailed model description and
analysis. This involves both conceptual analysis across the key dimensions and the
presentation of simulation results. These results reveal both differences and surprising
similarities between the models. Finally, we discuss the implications of these results
from both a technical and philosophical point of view. Specifically, we argue, based
on the simulation results, that neither model solves the fundamental bootstrapping
problem of testimonial knowledge. We close with a brief summary and an outlook
on further developments and potential future research on formal models of source
reliability.
2 Dimensions of comparison
2.1 General assumptions
Before describing both models in detail we start by highlighting general characteristics.
First and foremost, the models under discussion assume that credences are plausibly
modelled by probabilities. A further shared assumption of both models is standard
Bayesian conditionalization, that is, they are committed to the claim that rationality
requires updating credence by Bayes’ rule:
p′(H)  p(H |E)  p(E |H) · p(H)
p(E)
(1)
Finally, the two models share a common conception of the reliability problem
itself, in as much as they both implement the intuitive strategy outlined with the
initial vaccination scepticism example above. Both models use evidence reports to
simultaneously revise beliefs both about the underlying hypothesis and the reliability of
the source. Hence the basic structure of the source reliability problem as conceptualised
by both the Olsson and the Bovens and Hartmann model may be represented by the
Bayes net in Fig. 1. It requires assumptions about the nature of three relevant random
variables of REP, REL and H.
As we will see, the two models can be distinguished by whether they formalize
the reliability of a source as point probabilities for a binary variable or a more com-
plex probability distributions over a continuous variable. The Bayes net stipulates the
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independence of REL and H. This assumption is shared by both models as a plausi-
ble condition on the relationship between the source and the claim at issue: violating
this independence assumption would suggest the reliability of the source determin-
ing the state of the world at issue in the hypothesis, or, alternatively, this state of the
world determining the reliability of the source. To return to one of our examples, non-
independence would mean that vaccines causing autism could causally influence the
characteristics of the reporting source, a fairly patent absurdity in the real world.
Two clarificatory notes are in order here: The independence assumption does not
imply that a source could not be more reliable in reporting truthfully contingent on
the truth of the hypothesis. Furthermore, there might be specific cases where non-
independence is justified. One plausible example where the truth of a hypothesis may
actually impact reliability concerns hypotheses about human psychology: imagine the
focal agent is concerned with the hypothesis that human agents suffer from confirma-
tion bias. If this hypothesis is true, the source of testimonial evidence is less likely to
be reliable, and therefore, the hypothesis is not independent of the estimation of relia-
bility. But for standard hypothesis—such as the vaccination scepticism example—the
independence assumption seems well justified.
However, the models, at least in their application to date, differ in how they treat the
independence/non-independence of multiple reports. For computational reasons, the
Olsson model, which has been used primarily for agent-based modelling, considers
multiple reports to be independent even when they come from the same source, in the
sense that they are not modelled in a shared network. By contrast, applications of the
Bovens and Hartmann model have consistently represented multiple reports within
the same Bayes’ net in order to capture appropriately relations between them. The
consequences of this difference are discussed in greater detail below.
Finally, the models differ in their conception of what it means for a source to be
‘unreliable’: In general, a source could be reliable, if not perfectly so, it could be a pure
randomizer (unmoored from the truth), or even a systematic liar. In principle, it would
make sense for the focal agent to be able to learn all these possibilities, that is, reach
all logically possible values for reliability. We call the ability of a model to learn all
of these possibilities reachability. At the same time, however, an anti-reliable source,
unlike a randomizer, still has a lawful relationship with the truth. Hence, one might
want to exclude the systematic liar by assumption in order to avoid treating a source
as anti-reliable on conceptual, technical or practical grounds. Technically, doing so
can simplify the model. Practically, if we assume that there are few actual systematic
liars in the world, this omission may actually increase the accuracy of our beliefs,
as it avoids falsely classifying someone as a systematic liar. As outlined in greater
detail below, the Olsson model specifically allows learning of anti-reliability while
the basic Bovens and Hartmann model does not, instead conceptualising “unreliable”
as ‘randomizing’. At the same time, we will see below that an in principle ability to
infer anti-reliability may not suffice for anti-reliability to be reachable in practice.
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2.2 Behavior
With respect to the models’ behavior, we will focus on three key aspects: First,
we discuss the models’ precise conception of reliability and how they construe the
problem faced by the epistemic agent. Second, we analyse the accuracy of the result-
ing beliefs in a simulated world with a ‘ground truth’ such that the accuracy of
beliefs can be measured. Third, we consider the effective reachability in both mod-
els.
By accuracy, we mean a measure of the agent’s credence distance to the truth of
the matter. The main concern is with the accuracy of belief in H, as this is the piece of
world knowledge the agent is interested in learning. To measure accuracy, we utilize
the Brier score (Brier 1950), which is effectively the squared error and constitutes a
proper scoring rule.3 Additionally, we will examine the models’ ability to accurately
reflect the true reliabilities of the source.
As just noted, while the ability to discern anti-reliability can be built into a model by
assumption, it is not obvious that the model is effectively able to move on trajectories
ranging through all parts of the parameter space (what we call ‘reachability’). What
will be of particular interest is whether a model is capable of learning that a source is
anti-reliable given initial trust in that source.
3 Detailedmodel description
We next consider the Bovens and Hartmann (2003) and Olsson (2011) models in more
detail.
3.1 Bovens–Hartmann-model
3.1.1 Informal description
The Bovens–Hartmann-model (BH from hereon) is built to represent an agent trying
to distinguish between a random source of reports and a reliable one. Key to the model
specification are two assumptions, described in Bovens and Hartmann (2003):
(1) A reliable source is perfectly reliable, that is, it reports that the hypothesis is true
when it is true and says it is false when it is false. Hence, reliable sources make no
mistakes. All the uncertainty is situated in the focal agent who is only partially
informed about whether the source is reliable or not.
(2) If the source is unreliable, it is a randomizer, that is, whether or not it provides a
positive report is determined at random (e.g., through a coin toss), and is unrelated
to the true state of the world.
3 While there is debate about choice of scoring rule, in particular whether squared or log error scores are
more appropriate (e.g., Leitgeb and Pettigrew 2010), there is no need to employ multiple accuracy measures
in our case, as those arguments largely relate to differences occurring when applying those measures to
multiple propositions.
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The probability that an unreliable source will randomly generate a positive report
is determined by the so-called randomization parameter, a. This allows sources to be
biased toward a particular type of report. Changes to this parameter can have significant
effects on the overall behavior of the model (see e.g., Jarvstad and Hahn 2011). In this
paper, we follow Bovens and Hartmann (2003) in simply assuming a value of 0.5 as
a default.
Clearly, real world sources do not typically create answers at random. In this sense
the BH model is not a plausible generative model of assertion (nor is it intended
as such). Both the empirical literature on testimony (Pornpitakpan 2004) and other
formal treatments (e.g., Schum 1994; Harris et al. 2016) have decomposed ‘reliability’
into more fine-grained concepts such as veracity, bias, and accuracy, that seek to more
faithfully reflect how testimony comes about. However, the BH model is plausible as a
minimal model that the focal agent can form about an unknown source. Such an agent
will typically know little to nothing about the mental processes or factors by which
the source will come to generate a report if unreliable. ‘Randomization’ represents a
convenient way of capturing that lack of knowledge, formalising the idea that for a fully
unreliable source the content of their report is uncorrelated with the truth. Moreover,
if P(REL) is not known but inferred, the BH model can at least indirectly represent
degrees of reliability as a mixture between a randomizing source and a reliable source.
In other words, though the model assumptions are clearly idealizations, Bovens and
Hartmann maintain that the model can still be utilized to represent partially reliable
sources: from the point of view of the focal agent, the source is subjectively fallible
such that for a given report, the agent cannot be certain whether it is correct.
3.1.2 Formal model4
The fully specified model must define the calculation of the posterior estimation of
reliability, P′(REL) and the posterior degree of belief in H, P′(H). The focal agent
holds the corresponding prior beliefs, P(REL) and P(H).5 To calculate the posteriors,
the four conditional probabilities implied by the Bayes net have to be determined.
They follow from the two conditions stated informally above:
P(REP  1|H 1, REL  1)  1
P(REP  1|H 0, REL  1)  0
P(REP  1|H 0, REL  0)  a
P(REP  1|H 1, REL  0)  a
The corresponding probabilities for REP 0 follow accordingly from the two
assumptions. This leads to the following equations as shown by Bovens and Hartmann:
P ′(H)  P(H) · (P(RE L) + (1 − P(RE L) · a))
P(H) · (P(RE L) + (1 − P(RE L) · a)) + (1 − P(H)) · (1 − P(RE L) · a)
(2)
4 Appendix A contains a standardized ODD description as an alternative representation of the model
for reference and further clarification.
5 We use P(V ) to denote P(V  1) as a shorthand.
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and
P ′(RE L)  P(H) · P(RE L)
P(H) · P(RE L) + (1 − P(RE L)) · a (3)
3.2 Olssonmodel
3.2.1 Informal description
The key difference between the Olsson model and the BH model is the representation
of reliability. In the Olsson model, the focal agent maintains a distribution over possible
reliabilities, ranging from perfect reliability to randomization (as in BH), through to
anti-reliability, that is, a source that lies consistently.
This changes substantially what targets can plausibly be modelled, motivating the
formally more complex interpretation of reliability: The BH model in its basic form
presented above is inherently unable to classify a source as a systematic liar; hence,
any application for which this possibility needs to be maintained deviates from the
assumptions of the BH model.
But, as it is able to represent systematic anti-correlation with the truth, the Olsson
agent can also wrongly take a source to be a liar. Even more problematic would seem
to be that the focal agent can hold a prior on the hypothesis that implies the source’s
anti-reliability (at least for hypothesis incongruent evidence), or vice versa, as the
agent utilizes their expectation to evaluate the evidential impact of a report. Since
priors in a subjective Bayesian framework are unrestricted as long as they are chosen
from the open interval (0, 1), this does not constitute a violation of the principles of
Bayesian rationality; but the consequence that the choice of priors determines whether
evidence is supporting or refuting evidence appears problematic. To better understand
the exact structure and consequences, we have to turn to the formal model.
3.2.2 Formal model6
Analogous to BH, the model is described by two equations. Credence in H is updated
according to
Pt+1(H)  Pt (H |E)  M[τt ] · Pt (H)M[τt ] · Pt (H) + (1 − M[τt ]) · (1 − Pt (H)) (4)
where τ is the reliability distribution and M its mean. Subjective reliability is updated
according to
τt+1(x)  τ(x |E)  x · Pt (H) + (1 − x) · (1 − Pt (H))M[τt ] · Pt (H) + (1 − M[τt ]) · (1 − Pt (H))τt (x) (5)
The credence update (Eq. 4) is structurally very similar to basic Bayesian updating
(Eq. 1), with the key difference that the static conditional probability (likelihood)
6 For the ODD style model description, see again Appendix A.
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of receiving a piece of evidence is replaced by the dynamic reliability model. The
evolution of the reliability distribution (Eq. 5) is rather difficult to extract from the
point-wise representation in Eq. 5; qualitatively, however, the distribution’s mean
increases with belief-congruent evidence and shrinks with belief incongruent evidence,
while the variance of the distribution diminishes over time, modelling the increasing
certainty about the degree of reliability of the source as the amount of evidence grows.
To fully specify the model, it is necessary to choose a particular probability distri-
bution for τ. For the purpose of this paper, a beta distribution is used.7
4 Model comparison
4.1 Conceptual contrasts
Conceptually, both models can be applied to sources of any kind. In the social network
simulations of Olsson (2011, 2013), for example, the model is used both to characterise
the testimony agents receive from others, and, agents’ own information gathering from
the world. Likewise, Bovens and Hartmann (2003) use their model not just to capture
testimonial reports, but also the reliability of scientific instruments. In that sense, the
two models are entirely general models of source reliability.
However, it is worth considering further the models’ application specifically to
testimony. Conceptually, both models deal with the same aspect of testimony, leaving
others aside. Specifically, Collins et al. (2018) distinguish two aspects of testimony
and, with it, source reliability: the first is what they call the “testimonial aspect”.
Here, the testimony is the evidence, as when an expert tells us that something is the
case. For example, a doctor may tell us that we suffer from a particular disease. The
second is what Collins et al. call the “transmission aspect” of testimony. Here, the
source transmits evidence and concerns about source reliability are focussed on the
faithfulness of that transmission. For example, the doctor may tell us that our blood
tests show elevated levels of a marker that itself provides evidence of that particular
disease. We do not have access to that test ourselves (nor typically does the doctor,
who merely receives a report on its outcome from the lab). In this latter case, the report
is not on the status of a hypothesis itself, but rather on evidence for that hypothesis,
such as a testable consequence. Both models described above deal only with the
testimonial aspect. However, the transmission aspect can be modelled in the Bovens
and Hartmann framework through a simple extension that includes a further node
concerning a testable consequence in the network, CON , between hypothesis and
report (see Fig. 2, and Chapter 4, Bovens and Hartmann 2003). It is less clear how this
could be captured in the Olsson framework. So, although, the Olsson model and the
basic BH model that are our main focus in this paper both exclude the transmission
aspect, they differ in the extent to which they may readily be expanded to capture other
aspects of testimony as well.
7 For repeated dichotomous events (Bernoulli processes) and resulting Binomial distributions, the beta
distribution is normally considered an appropriate prior distribution, since it is the conjugate distribution of
the binomial distribution.
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Fig. 2 Bayes net for a single
witness report (REP) on a
testable consequence (CON) of
hypothesis (H) with reliability
(REL) in the BH model
In their shared focus on ‘pure testimony’ (i.e., the ‘testimonial’ aspect), both the
Olsson model and the BH model share also the fact that they seek to unpack the effective
diagnosticity of a report as captured by the likelihoods P(REP|H) and P(REP|¬H).
These are the basic quantities in Bayes’ rule defining the evidential value of the source’s
report. In the case of testimony, when we speak with a source with whom we have
no prior familiarity or little familiarity, these likelihoods are unknown or not known
exactly. They must consequently be estimated. As Hahn et al. (2018b) outline, there
are two very different ways in which such an estimate may be formed. The first is
what they call “outcome-based” estimation. Here, past predictions are squared with
eventual outcomes to calculate predictive success. This is then used to estimate the
relevant likelihoods. That estimate may be as simple as using the relative frequency
of truthful reports as a direct stand-in for the likelihood, or a more sophisticated
statistical procedure of Bayesian inference may be used where its assumptions are
met (e.g., Kruschke 2010). Recast in terms of our earlier urn example, the agent uses
repeated draws from the urn—without a partially reliable intermediary, hence 100%
fidelity—to assess the likelihoods associated with the urn. Outcome-based update
therefore requires definite knowledge on the actual outcomes, in this case, the color of
the balls drawn. For a real-world example, one might consider the case of pregnancy
tests, where pragmatically certain knowledge that a positive test result was eventually
genuinely associated with pregnancy and vice versa for negative test results can be
used to estimate the reliability of the test.
However, in many real-world circumstances, knowledge about past outcomes for
the source in question may not be available, giving rise to a second way to form such
estimates, illustrated in our opening vaccine example. Here, revising beliefs about the
reliability of the source on the basis of the congruence of the report(s) with one’s
current uncertain beliefs provides a potential alternative. Because those beliefs are
presently uncertain (in contrast to known outcomes) this second mechanism has been
labelled “belief” or “expectation-based” updating (Collins et al. 2018; Hahn 2018b).
As discussed above, both the Olsson and the Bovens and Hartmann model formalise
such a strategy. To this end, both provide what Bovens and Hartmann (2003) call
an endogenous model of reliability. The basic likelihoods P(REP|H), P(REP|¬H)
capture reliability exogenously, that is, leaving the inferential means by which they
are determined outside of the model, drawing only on the estimates that result from
those processes; by contrast, both BH and Olsson model include those inferential
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Fig. 3 A hierarchical model in
which the reliability of the
reporting source is captured
explicitly. Three levels are
distinguished: the underlying
hypothesis H, the evidence E,
and the source’s actual report of
that evidence Erep
means within the model. Inference takes place simultaneously about both the truth or
falsity of the hypothesis in question and the reliability of the source itself. At any given
point in time, these more complex models determine an effective likelihood P(REP|H),
but that likelihood changes dynamically over time.
There are other Bayesian ways in the literature to unpack that effective likelihood.8
For example, Schum (1981) or Pearl (1988) advocated the use of a simple hierar-
chical model (see Fig. 3) to capture the uncertainty about the veracity of a source’s
report. Alternatively, standard methods of Bayesian inference for estimating hidden
parameters (e.g., Kruschke 2010), could, as mentioned above, be used to infer the
effective likelihood from the data. However, the latter ultimately do very different
things. Specifically, they generate estimates of the likelihood that change dynamically
over time. However, the data are used only for those estimates; the data are not simul-
taneously used to learn about the truth or falsity of the hypothesis. By contrast, the
simple hierarchical model of Schum and Pearl uses the report (i.e., ‘data’) only to
make an inference about the hypothesis: the reliability of the source (i.e., the effective
likelihood) remains fixed and unchanging.
Finally, the other popular procedure for dealing with the uncertainty of evidence
in general and testimony in particular, Jeffrey conditionalization (Pearl 1998; Jeffrey
2004), also does not capture reliability endogenously. Whereas standard condition-
alization assumes that one comes to know E with certainty (P(E)  1 or P(E) 
0), Jeffrey conditionalization is less restrictive, and allows contingent observations
themselves to have non-extreme probabilities (see Eq. 5).
Pt+1(H)  Pt (H |E) · Pt+1(E) + Pt (H |E) · Pt+1(E) (6)
In other words, the uncertainty concerning the evidence is folded into a single
quantity P(E), which is combined with priors via total probability to yield a probability
of the hypothesis in light of that evidence. As the determination of the uncertain
8 A quite different perspective is taken by the Lehrer-Wagner model (cf. Lehrer 1976), which can be
viewed as implementing a sequential process of reliability learning through an iterative weighted linear
averaging procedure. However, this style of model differs in its target: It assumes that the agents processed
all information from the world in advance, and only have to figure out the implications of their initial weight
assessments and credences.
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evidence P(E) is entirely external to the inference, there is no model and hence no
inferential procedure for deriving it or dynamically revising it over time. In short,
whereas the hierarchical model of Schum (1981) unpacks testimony into a report
(which is certain, thus allowing conditionalization) and the (uncertain) evidence being
reported on, Jeffrey conditionalization treats the evidence (in this case testimony) as
itself uncertain.
Both the BH and the Olsson model follow the Schum model in this regard but allow
dynamic updating about reliability by implementing expectation-based updating. Set
against these alternative suggestions for the treatment of uncertain evidence, the BH
and the Olsson model may thus seem like minor formal variants of the same underly-
ing intuition about expectation-based revision. Nevertheless, there are important, and
consequential, differences between these two models as well.
As noted above, the first, and most obvious difference, lies in their respective
definitions of what it means to be unreliable. For Bovens and Hartmann, the lowest
reliability a source can attain is to be entirely non-diagnostic: reports are random with
respect to the hypothesis in question. By contrast, the Olsson model considers this to
be just one point along the spectrum from full reliability to full anti-reliability, where
the source is perfectly anti-correlated with the truth. In other words, the effective
likelihood ranges from 0 to 1 in the Olsson model, but only from 0.5 to 1 for BH. It is
an interesting empirical question under which circumstances people may be willing
to infer anti-reliability of sources in their everyday lives. The existence of so-called
“backfire” or “boomerang” effects in the context of persuasion (Nyhan and Reifler
2010) suggest the possibility of anti-reliability in real world scenarios (though other
inferences such as arguments from ignorance, see Harris et al. (2013), may also be
in play here), and there is at least tentative evidence for anti-reliability effects in
lab-based, experimental studies of argumentation (Collins et al. 2018).
The more fundamental difference between the two models is that while the Olsson
model allows for a stochastic relationship between the report and the truth or falsity
of the hypothesis, the BH model assumes a fully deterministic relationship, which the
message recipient is merely uncertain about: if the source is reliable, then it accurately
reports the true state of the hypothesis in question.
This is not a minor difference. To illustrate we return to the urn task introduced
above. The task the Olsson model is addressing is, in effect, this: Imagine, once again,
trying to learn whether the urn the experimenter has chosen is the one that contains
predominantly red or predominantly blue balls. To inform your choice of hypothesis
(predominantly red/predominantly blue) you receive draws from this urn and must
revise your beliefs in light of those draws. However, the exact composition of the urn
is also unknown; that is, you do not know the exact underlying proportion of red and
blue balls, so you do not know how diagnostic a given draw is. Hence you are trying to
simultaneously revise your beliefs both about whether the draws are coming from the
predominantly red or the predominantly blue urn and about the likelihoods, that is,
the underlying proportion of red balls. Furthermore, you are even willing to entertain
the hypothesis that the colours are inverted (anti-reliability).
By contrast, the BH model assumes the urns contain just red balls in the one urn and
just blue balls in the other. Once again, one of these urns is selected and you receive
a draw. If your source is fully reliable, the ball comes from the urn itself, so it will
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definitively tell you which urn you are faced with. If the source is unreliable, however,
the ball isn’t from the urn at all, and its colour is entirely random with respect to the
chosen urn.
In effect, the Olsson model is conceptually trying to address, in entirety, the problem
of coming to know the likelihoods, whereas the BH model is trying to determine
whether or not a reporting source is fully reliable.
The full consequences of this distinction are best exemplified by considering a set
of reports from the source, say {report 1  1, report 2  0, report 3  1}. For the
Olsson model, that set is, in principle, compatible with a whole range of reliabilities;
which posterior reliability is arrived at depends on the (current) priors for both the
hypothesis and the source’s reliability. By contrast, for the BH model, that data set
is logically inconsistent with the source being reliable, so that the posterior degree
of belief in the reliability of the source will necessarily go to 0, and the posterior for
the hypothesis will equal the prior as the report has no diagnostic value—regardless
of the priors for both hypothesis and reliability.
This contrast between the two models is related to a further fundamental difference
which concerns the way the models have been applied when there are multiple reports
from the same source. Theoretical applications of the BH model, whether in the con-
text of conceptual analysis (Bovens and Hartmann 2003) or in application to human
behavioral data (Harris et al. 2012; Harris et al. 2016; Jarvstad and Hahn 2011), have
all included the multiple reports in the same Bayesian network. This is normatively
correct, guarantees optimal inference, and means that there are no differences in out-
come depending on whether the data are received all at once, or sequentially. By the
same token, the order in which sequential data are received is entirely irrelevant.
In contrast, application of the Olsson model in past research has assumed a ‘local’,
sequential process, where the model is applied iteratively to successive pieces of evi-
dence, assuming simply the posterior of the last update as the new prior, and treating
the evidence as otherwise unrelated. This leads to a mis-weighting of that evidence
vis a vis the normative (global) model. As outlined above, the Olsson model assumes
independence of hypothesis and reliability. But, on receipt of a report, these two vari-
ables become dependent (see the phenomenon of “explaining away” in common effect
models, e.g., Pearl 1988). Normatively, this dependence also affects the probability of
subsequent reports: receiving a first, positive, report affects the probabilities of receiv-
ing a second and third. A Bayes net that envisions the possibility of such reports from
the outset appropriately factors in these dynamic changes. A purely ‘local’ sequen-
tial update does not, because it fails to factor in the emerging correlation between
hypothesis and reliability, giving rise to either over- or underweighting of evidence,
conditional on its consistency with expectation. Figure 4 illustrates the contrast:
Figure 4a implements a global viewpoint on the possible reports. Such a model
includes all possible reports that could eventually be received from the source. Hence
the updates for a string of sequential updates on evidence reports will lead to the
same final result as if these reports had all been received simultaneously. Had they
been received simultaneously and updating consequently took place in one step, there
would, of course, be no intermediate update of P(REL). As a result, the eventual
outcome is the same regardless of whether the reports are received in batches or
individually, and regardless of the order in which they arise. Consequently, this global
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Fig. 4 In Fig. 4a, both reports are part of the initial Bayes net, that is, part of the algebra from the start. In
Fig. 4b, the second report only emerges subsequently and is linked to the first report only because the new
values of HYP and REL (i.e., HYP|REP1 and REL|REP1) have been copied across after the updates of step
1
perspective may be seen as the normatively correct approach on standard Bayesian
analysis.
By the same token, however, the global perspective implies that the focal agent
effectively uses the reliability prior for their belief update on all reports (as any
sequential outcome is equivalent to updating on all the evidence at once). So even
though the global model provides a posterior for REL after obtaining all reports, the
fact that the same prior uniquely determines all reports conflicts with the idea that
the focal agent is actually dynamically adjusting source reliability after each report in
order to adequately evaluate future reports; the agent calculates a reliability posterior,
but that reliability posterior does not have any direct impact on the subsequent belief
updates. Any ‘learning’ of reliability in the global model is arguably epiphenomenal
with respect to credence in the hypothesis itself.
If, in contrast, the posterior is used directly as the prior for the next update, one not
only enters the world of truly sequential trust updating, but also the world of order
effects. Figure 4b illustrates this local (inherently sequential) procedure. Here, both
reliability and credence in H are updated after one report, and these posteriors are
then used as priors to update on the second report, and so forth. Effectively, such a
local model relaxes the independence of REL and H. As the focal agent estimates
credences consistent with the report, these two variables become correlated for the
following reports. This creates a dependence of the final state of the credences on
the order in which reports arrive (Hahn et al. 2018b). It is hard to see this order
dependence as rational (unlike seeming order dependence in the context of Jeffrey
123
Synthese
conditionalization, where closer scrutiny reveals that other things have also changed,
see Osherson 2002).9
Because it fails to fully respect dependencies between variables as a result of ‘local’
application (at least in its typical application), the Olsson model constitutes only a naïve
Bayesian agent, rather than the Bayes optimal model.
These differences in use (global vs. local) between the two models make sense
in the models’ respective domains of application. The BH model has been used to
explicate formally fundamental intuitions about evidence, seeking to probe their
normative foundations. These analyses have typically involved stylised examples
with only a few reports. By contrast, the Olsson model is the core component of
agent-based simulations involving many agents in a social network. Computational
reasons alone already mean that those agents must ignore the network structure: that
is, they treat reports from other agents who might themselves be communicating
(Olsson 2011) as independent from one another, even though communication creates
dependencies. The local application with respect to multiple reports from a single
source is in keeping with that limitation.
Furthermore, ‘local’ updating seems largely unavoidable for actual, real-world
agents: it seems impossible to know in advance what kind of future evidence a source
may eventually come to report on an issue. The only way an agent could deal with this
lack of foresight is to remember all past reports and, after each report received, ret-
rospectively form the appropriate global model and recompute using the initial priors
for both reliability and hypothesis. This not only seems unrealistic in practice, it also,
once again, renders the reliability revision process itself entirely moot.
At the same time, naïve Bayesian models often perform surprisingly well in
practical machine learning contexts (e.g., Hand and Yu 2001). So it is of interest to
determine how well they solve the source reliability problem in practice.
Hence, we subsequently focus on local (sequential) updating. In order to examine
this, we will take a machine learning perspective by defining a simple ‘world’; we
then simulate performance data from our artificial agents in that world and score
their performance. We conduct such simulations both for the Olsson model and for
a sequentialised, ‘local’ version of the BH model (implementing the procedure of
Fig. 4b).
Crucially, once the BH model is applied locally, it no longer retains the original
consistency constraint. The model in this regard now behaves just like the Olsson
model despite its hard-coded logical constraints, because now only one response is
considered at any given point in time. The two models can thus be compared more
generally, both with respect to accuracy and updated trust, shedding light in particular
on the impact of the possibility of viewing a source as ‘anti-reliable’ (present only in
the Olsson model) and the consequences of this for reachability.
9 One reason that order dependence is usually not something to worry about for medical tests is that their
user does not expect to learn their reliability from their own experience in applying the test, but rather from
extensive testing that was necessary to admit the test to the market.
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4.2 Comparative performance in a simulated world
With these conceptual points in mind, we can now turn to both qualitative and
quantitative comparison of model performance within a standardized simulated envi-
ronment (for full details and additional explanations of the simulation experiments see
Appendix B). For Olsson, examining the model in a simulated environment simply
extracts a single agent from the social network context, in order to clarify its behavior.
For the Bovens and Hartmann model, we developed the sequential variant from the
basic model to enable a plausible comparison with the inherently sequential Olsson
model.
Hahn et al. (2018b) already conducted such an investigation for the Olsson model.
Specifically, they simulated a world in which the focal agent sequentially receives 10
pieces of evidence from the same source. Each piece of evidence was a testimonial
report directly asserting the truth or falsity of the target hypothesis. After each piece
of evidence, the agent revised its beliefs in both the hypothesis and the reliability of
the source. These final beliefs were then compared to the ‘true state of the world’,
the simulation ground truth, for evaluation. This process was then repeated over many
such sequences of 10 pieces of evidence in order to provide stable estimates.
The evidence itself was generated according to the ‘true’ (objective) likelihood
governing the source: that likelihood determined the probability that the simulation
independently and stochastically generates a true as opposed to false report. In order to
provide comprehensive insight into model behavior, the simulations probed behavior
across a range of key parameters. Specifically, the simulations examined the range
of possible objective likelihoods from 0 to 1 (in increments of 0.05). As there were
multiple runs for each likelihood value, it was also possible to vary the base rate at
which the hypothesis itself was true or false. This allowed Hahn et al. (2018b) to probe
the effects of providing agents with an informative prior, namely true knowledge of
the base rate, on both the accuracy of their beliefs in the hypothesis and on their sub-
jective trust in the source. Specifically, the simulations combined the range of possible
base rates from 0 to 1 (in increments of 0.05) factorially with all possible objective
likelihoods. Finally, Hahn et al. (2018b) examined the impact of using different initial
values for the subjective trust in the source. We focus here on the central results for an
initial trust distribution of beta(2, 1). This distribution has an expected value of 2/3,
representing a ‘healthy dose of scepticism’ concerning the source’s reliability, while
nevertheless considering the source to provide evidence that is more likely reliable
than not.
Finally, to isolate more generally the effects of expectation-based updating, Hahn
et al. (2018) also implemented a so-called ‘fixed-trust’ agent, which does not dynam-
ically modify subjective trust. In order to otherwise match the agents, the fixed-trust
agent started with a subjective trust of p  0.66 and simply stuck with this throughout.
The simulation involved, for each parameter combination, 1000 simulated runs of
length 10 for these agents, with the evidence at each step generated randomly according
to the underlying objective likelihood. The resultant final beliefs were then compared
to the true hypothesis on that run, with accuracy measured by the squared error (Brier
score, Brier 1950).
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Fig. 5 A comparison of the mean (in)accuracy (squared error) values for the trust-updating agents in the
Bovens–Hartmann (BH) model and the Olsson model as well as for fixed-trust agents and optimal agents.
(The results for the optimal agent slightly differ from those by Hahn et al. (2018b). Here, we matched the
optimal agent more closely to the other agents by taking the objective likelihoods to generate evidence
stochastically (instead of using an exact frequency determined by the likelihood)). Shown are the results
of simulating 1000 sweeps per data point at the underlying simulated, 21 true likelihoods (x-axis) and 21
base rates also used in the following surface plots. Results are shown aggregated across base-rates, which
seemed irrelevant here. Hence each data point in the figure represents the mean across 21,000 runs of agents
receiving 10 pieces of evidence. In all cases, the initial degree of belief in claim H itself is 0.5
Figure 5 summarises those results for the simulations in which the agents started
with an uninformative prior regarding the hypothesis itself of P(H)  0.5. Graphed
are the results for the Olsson agent, the fixed-trust agent and an optimal agent that
knows the true source reliability (i.e., the objective likelihood), as seen also in Fig. 4
of Hahn et al. (2018b). However, the figure additionally includes the results of the
matching new simulations with the local BH agent.
On the x-axis is the range of objective likelihoods, on the y-axis is the mean accuracy
of the final belief in the target hypothesis, averaged over the multiple runs. Figure 5
reveals that there is surprisingly little difference in accuracy between the fixed-trust
and the two reliability-updating agents. Not only is the Olsson agent’s performance
remarkably similar to the fixed-trust agent’s (as in Hahn et al. 2018b), the same is true
for the fixed-trust and the BH agent, and BH and Olsson agents are almost identical.
Examining specifically the range of objective reliabilities below 0.5, we see that none
of the agents deal successfully with anti-reliability. Neither of the reliability updating
agents manages to display adequate reachability, and neither does much better than
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the fixed-trust agent.10 Faced with a ‘Cartesian demon’ who is a systematic liar, none
of the models can learn the anti-reliability of their source, even though the Olsson
model is capable of representing it. This is because the models effectively have only
the consistency of the data stream itself to revise their beliefs: once they have started
out by (mildly) trusting the source, consistent anti-reliable information cannot be
perceived as such. But such initial trust is unavoidable in practice, because an Olsson
agent who is agnostic about the source’s reliability (i.e., p 0.5) cannot learn anything
from that source. Unlike the Olsson agent, the BH agent could, in principle, start with
a trust prior of 0.5 (because given the right values of the randomization parameter this
need not translate into an effective likelihood ratio of 1); but this, of course, is of no
help given that anti-reliability cannot be represented in the model.
Reachability becomes possible only when the models are provided with the true
base rate of the underlying hypothesis as a prior. Figure 6 shows the extent to which
base-rate knowledge allows the models to harness the full power of expectation-based
updating for estimating trust. The top row shows trust (subj. likelihood) after 10 pieces
of evidence for both the Olsson and the BH model for the models starting with the
uninformative prior of P(H)  0.5. The bottom row of Fig. 6 shows that same trust
when models start with the base rate as their prior for P(H). Performance is now
displayed across different base rates, as the value of the base rate has a significant
effect for the prior knowledge agents. For the Olsson model, the mean trust after
10 pieces of evidence approaches the objective likelihood at least for more extreme
hypothesis base rates. This can be seen from the fact that the trust values come to
lie almost on the diagonal at the front and the back face of the cube containing the
corresponding landscape plot (Fig. 6, bottom right panel). Unsurprisingly, the BH
model with its more restrictive representation scheme cannot match this performance.
However, the actual accuracy gains that the Olsson model achieves as a result
are limited. Figure 7 shows further landscape plots across base rates and objective
likelihoods to illustrate this. The top row plots show the mean posterior belief in the
hypothesis after the 10 pieces of evidence for the Olsson and BH models, as well
as for the fixed-trust agent. If the (mean) posteriors were inferred correctly, the mean
posterior in this figures would correspond to the base rates (resulting in a diagonal plane
with base-rate  posterior). The middle row of plots shows the corresponding mean
accuracy of those beliefs. The bottom row, finally, shows the variance in the resultant
accuracy. Whereas Fig. 5 showed the relationship between objective likelihood of
the source (x-axis) and accuracy (y-axis) averaged across the range of base rates, the
landscape plots of Fig. 7 shows this relationship at each possible value of the base rate
(z-axis). Once the agents have access to base-rate knowledge to set their prior for the
target hypothesis, the actual base rate has a significant impact on the final beliefs and,
with that, the accuracies formed, because of the interaction between hypothesis prior
and trust already seen in Fig. 6. As a result, the Olsson agent does noticeably better
than both the BH agent and the fixed-trust agent with objective likelihoods below
0.5, that is, when the source is anti-reliable. Specifically, the differences between
10 This also confirms the robustness claims in Hahn et al. (2018b) who argue that the results of their
simulations reflect deep structural problems, and not merely details of the specific implementation of
source reliability.
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Fig. 6 Comparison of simulation results for trust (subjective reliability representation) for the Bovens and
Hartmann Model and the Olsson Model across likelihoods and base rates. The upper panels show mean
trust for a belief prior of 0.5. The lower panels show results for a situation with previous knowledge: It
shows the same agents when they know the true base rate and use this as the prior
BH and Olsson agents indicate the value of being able to represent ‘anti-reliability’.
Nevertheless, there remain high levels of error when faced with anti-reliable sources
across considerable regions of the space. This is one of the reasons to distinguish
reachability and accuracy; although it appears intuitive that an ability to represent anti-
reliability should, ceteris paribus, increase accuracy, this is not observed throughout
all relevant parameter values in the actual models. Moreover, at high levels of source
reliability (i.e., obj. likelihood) and extreme base rates, the Olsson model with base-
rate knowledge starts to do worse, not only than the BH and fixed-trust models, but
also than the Olsson model without base-rate knowledge (cf. Fig. 5).
Figure 8 helps explain why. To put model performance into context, Fig. 8 brackets
the space of possible results by showing the accuracy of a simulated agent who simply
disregards the evidence altogether and responds with the base rate only, on the one
hand, and an optimal agent who starts with knowledge of the hypothesis base rate as
a prior and has knowledge of the true, objective likelihood on the other hand.
These two extremes essentially span the range of possible performance and different
approaches to trust will fall somewhere in between. In particular, consideration of the
base-rate only agent is illuminating because comparing its behavior to that of the
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Fig. 7 Comparison of simulation results for the sequential (local) trust updating Bovens and Hartmann
model, the Olsson model, and the fixed-trust agent with respect to the target hypothesis. The simulations
show results across the range of possible likelihoods and base rates. Each data point in each graph represents
the mean (variance) of 1000 runs of agents receiving 10 pieces of evidence at the underlying objective
generative likelihood (x-axis) and base rates. The agents’ prior belief in the hypothesis is set to the true
base rate. The simulations all use an initial trust of 0.66 (or a beta distribution B with α  2, β  1 and
an expected value of 0.66). Row 1 shows posterior degrees of belief in H, row 2 accuracy as measured by
squared error between posterior belief and true value of H, row 3 the variance thereof. (The data underlying
the second and third column of graphs are from Hahn et al. (2018b), Fig. 6)
Olsson model (but also the BH model) at extreme base rates indicates that for those
base rates, the two expectation-based updating models are so heavily influenced by
those expectations that they virtually ignore the data. This underscores further the
limitations of a purely expectation-based updating strategy when it comes to estimating
source reliability.
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Fig. 8 Performance of the optimal agent (left panel) and a data-blind agent (right panel) who responds
merely with the true underlying base rate
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we have critically evaluated the two main models of source reliability in
the formal epistemology literature. Though the models are similar in spirit in that both
implement so-called expectation-based (or belief-based) updating, there are formal
differences that are consequential for model performance. The BH model, in its stan-
dard version, only represents trust versus randomisation, whereas the Olsson model is
meant to learn the true likelihood embodied in the data generating process, including
the representation of anti-reliability. This implies that, in its global formulation, the
BH model dismisses all reports once an inconsistency in the data stream is identified.
This feature is eliminated in the sequential version.
When both models are applied as local, sequential, naive Bayesian agents in our
simulations without informing the agents with prior knowledge, the resultant accuracy
of both models is arguably more similar than it is distinct. Moreover, relative to both,
the credulous fixed-trust agent remains surprisingly competitive (for a similar result
in a very different context, see also Zollman 2015).
What the simulations of the sequential models show is that, first and foremost,
neither model is able to fundamentally solve the problem of source reliability in cir-
cumstances where there is no reference class of relevant past predictive success that
enables outcome-based estimates of the relevant likelihoods. Neither model offers an
effective solution to bootstrapping an accurate reliability estimate in order to evaluate
the truth of a given hypothesis in light of evidential reports.
This constitutes a significant normative gap. As Hawthorne (1994) points out,
Bayesian confirmation theory relies on the scientific community agreeing on the like-
lihoods; where there is no solid basis for that the entire endeavour remains up in the air.
Likewise, present day concerns about the integrity of our everyday information envi-
ronments, whether these concern politics, vaccines or climate change, seem unlikely
to be fully solved if normative solutions remain elusive. And, finally, the limitations
123
Synthese
of the models examined here have potential consequences for the normative standing
of the wider explanatory projects within epistemology that these models have served.
Two distinct normative limitations emerged from our analyses, one through simu-
lation, the other through conceptual analysis. First, our simulations illustrate that an
ability to represent anti-reliability formally is not enough to guarantee reachability
in practice. Needless to say, a model that cannot represent anti-reliability necessarily
fails in cases where a source actually is anti-reliable. The BH model could easily be
revised to make reliability a ternary variable (reliable, randomizer, liar),11 bringing
it more in line with the Olsson model in this regard. But as the simulations with the
Olsson model show, the representational capacity itself is not enough. More funda-
mentally, the focal agent’s decision about which kind of situation they are in is unduly
determined by the initial trust—which itself must be constrained for pragmatic rea-
sons. Providing the agents with relevant prior knowledge about (the base rate of H)
provided gains for, at least, some regions of the parameter space. But even that did not
provide reachability in general: there remain significant regions of the space where
the Olsson model cannot learn that a source is anti-reliable.
Second, comparing the BH and the Olsson model in their original formulation
made salient the global/local dimension. Only global versions of the expectation-
based updating models could qualify as optimal Bayesian models, so only they
could be deemed fully rational in the standard Bayesian sense. In order to avoid
over/underweighting of the evidence, the optimal model must represent the possi-
bility of all future reports within the initial algebra or recalculate beliefs entirely
anew after every report. This guards against order effects as experienced by the naïve
Bayesian versions, and only on the global version are the results of sequential and
batch updating equivalent. But the very fact that considering all of the evidence at
once yields the same result for the global model indicates that the potential revisions
to reliability are not actually inferentially relevant. This results in an undue influence
of the reliability prior. Only the initial prior for reliability influences the posterior
belief in the hypothesis. This means that, unlike priors for the hypothesis, the prior for
reliability doesn’t ‘wash out’ as more evidence is received. Even more worryingly, it
also means that the global models do not actually provide a procedure for reliability
updating. If final results are ultimately determined only by the initial reliability, the
global model cannot be said to be a model of adaptively learning the reliability of its
sources. In short, deeper consideration of the global/local issue reveals that neither
local nor global versions of these models provide fully adequate normative solutions,
albeit for very different reasons: the local model because it is subject to systematic
mis-weighting of evidence and order effects; the global model because it arguably
fails to adequately address the problem it is trying to solve.
As a result, current formal models of source reliability still fall short of a com-
pelling normative treatment of testimony. This is not to deny that both the Bovens
and Hartmann and the Olsson model have already proved invaluable in clarifying and
probing the issues. The limitations emerging, in our view, reflect deep and challenging
philosophical issues, not simple model defects. And these issues could not have been
formulated with this clarity without the models in question. Hence they have signifi-
11 Such an extension is discussed by Olsson (2005, ch. 4.3) with regard to the problem of coherence.
123
Synthese
cantly furthered understanding of the problems posed by testimony. We thus consider
these models, and future models like them, essential to the philosophical project both
of understanding testimony and deriving satisfactory normative approaches to it.
However, it may be that these particular models prove more enduring in the con-
text of more descriptive-explanatory applications. Part of the fundamental appeal
of the models lies in the fact that human beings seem to engage in something like
expectation-based updating, whether one ultimately comes to view this as normative
or not. Simulations with naïve Bayesian agents thus offer the possibility of deep insight
into phenomena such as group polarization (Olsson 2013) or the impact of changes to
the topology of our everyday information networks through the rise of social media
(e.g., Hahn et al. 2018a).
At the same time, such simulations may help further develop our normative intu-
itions by supplementing ex ante assumptions about rationality with ex post evaluation
based on the observed consequences of a strategy. This style of argument is already
standard in the form of thought experiments. Simulations provide further evidence
of unforeseen consequences for strategies that seem relevant to normative evaluation:
the fact that expectation-based updating offers so little benefit over simple, fixed-
trust strategies, for example, would have been difficult to foresee. Likewise, the fact
that the benefit of considerable advance knowledge on the truth or falsity of the tar-
get hypothesis helps calibrate trust but still does comparatively little for accuracy
would have been practically impossible to see. These results are disappointing for the
expectation-based updating strategy. If simulations then additionally highlight further
consequences such as the rise of polarization (Olsson 2013; Hahn et al. 2018), this
may shed further doubt on the desirability and hence rationality of expectation-based
estimates of source reliability.
In short, what intuitively seems rational in the abstract, may seem less so, once the
application of a strategy is made progressively more concrete. Formal models allow
the systematic exploration of descriptive consequences, both for individual agents and
assemblies of such agents in social networks; from their application, a revised set of
benchmarks for an adequate normative solution may eventually take shape.
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Appendix A: details of themodels
A.1 Overview
A.1.1 Purpose
This model represents an agent receiving evidence from the world and simultaneously
trying to learn the truth about a certain hypothesis H and the reliability of the evidence
on H it receives.
A.1.2 State variables and scales
The agents are defined by their subjective degree of belief in H, their estimation of
the reliability of their data source (represented depending on the agent type by either
a point probability or distribution) and their belief revision rule (see Submodels for
details).
The world external to the agent is defined by the base rate of H being true across
instantiations of the model and the objective likelihood of generating a piece of evi-
dence representative of the status of H in a given instantiation.
Model time is discrete and the mapping between model and target time is determined
by the frequency of inquiry (i.e. if collecting one piece of evidence takes 1 month in
a given research domain, one timestep of the model corresponds to 1 month). The
model operates only on a single time scale.
Overview12:
• Pobj (H  1): The probability of H being true across the relevant class of worlds
(base rate).
• Pobj (E  1|H  1): The objective reliability of the agent’s data source, which it
is trying to learn (objective likelihood).
• Psubj (H  1), short: bt (H): The agent’s subjective credence in H at t.
• Psubj (E  1|H  1), short Rt : The agent’s subjective estimation of the reliability
of its source (trust) at time t.
A.1.3 Process overview and scheduling
The model contains the following processes:
1. Data generation A piece of evidence is randomly generated by the world and
passed on to the agent (all evidence is binary).
2. Updating This process consists of two subprocesses.
(a) Belief revision The credence in H is updated according to the agent’s current
state and the data.
(b) Trust revision The agent’s estimation of its source’s reliability is updated
according to its current state and the data.
12 We adapted variable names to highlight the structural similarities between the models at the expense of
similarity to the original publications.
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Belief and trust revision are executed synchronously.
A.2 Design concepts
• Sensing Agents only access the state of the world (represented by the value of H)
via the evidence they receive. In addition, they are only capable to process binary
evidence.
• Stochasticity All randomness is encapsulated in the data generation process, deter-
mined by the base rate and the assumed objective reliability. It represents the
variation in data source reliability and fruitfulness; it represents any kind of random
error in observation.
• Observation For the purpose of our experiments, only the final belief and trust are
recorded. It is, however, both possible and meaningful to observe intermediate states
of the model.
A.3 Details
A.3.1 Initialization
Technically, both degree of belief and trust could be initialized with any mathematically
admissible value (though the models become trivial if any probabilities are instantiated
as 1 or 0). If not declared otherwise, the initial values for the experiments are:
• Prior belief: uniform (b0(H  1)  b0(H  0)  0.5).
• Prior trust: moderately trusting (r0  0.66 for BH, r0  beta(2, 1) with expected
value or mean M[r0]  2/3 for O).
A.3.2 Submodels
Data is generated via a Bernoulli process. At the begin of a model run, the value of
H ∈ {0, 1} is drawn according to Pobj (H). Then, whenever the agent receives data, a
piece of evidence is drawn according to Pobj (E  1|H  1).
It is assumed that P(E=1|H=1)=P(E=0|H=0) (both for the agent’s subjective esti-
mate and the objective probabilities of the data generating process).
On receiving a piece of data, the agent updates belief and trust; there are two types
of agents, we call them Bovens–Hartmann-agents (BH) and Olsson-agents (O).
A.3.2.1 Bovens–Hartmann The key assumption for this model is that every source
is either perfectly reliable or a strict randomizer:
• Every reliable source is perfectly reliable, i.e. reports in accordance with the true
value of H with probability 1.
• Every source that is not perfectly reliable is a randomizer, i.e. will report 1 with
probability a and 0 with probability 1–a, regardless of the value of H.
According to these assumptions, reliability is represented by the binary variable
REL.
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The resulting model is described by the following equations to calculate posterior
belief in H, bt+1 and posterior trust in the source, rt+1, conditioning on a report that
H 1 is true:
bt+1(H)  bt (H |E)  bt (H)(rt + (1 − rt )a)bt (H)(rt + (1 − rt )a) + (1 − bt (H))(1 − rt )a
rt+1  rt (RE L|E)  bt (H)rtbt (H)(rt + (1 − rt )a) + (1 − bt (H))(1 − rt )a
A.3.2.2 Olsson The Olsson variant of updating uses a point probability to represent
the degree of belief in H as well, but a probability distribution r(x) for the estimation of
source reliability. Otherwise, the probabilities have been adapted to mirror the notation
we used for the Bovens–Hartmann variant as closely as possible. M(r ) denotes the
mean (or expectation) of the distribution, here of the trust values r .
bt+1(H)  bt (H |E)  M[rt ]bt (H)M[rt ]bt (H) + (1 − M[rt ])(1 − bt (H))
rt+1(x)  rt (x |E)  xbt (H) + (1 − x)(1 − bt (H))M[rt ]bt (H) + (1 − M[rt ])(1 − bt (H))rt (x).
A.3.2.3 Simulation algorithm
1. Initialize priors (b0 and r0).
2. Draw H according to Pobj (H).
3. REPEAT n times:
(a) Generate evidence E according to Pobj (E |H).
(b) Set b to b(H|E)
(c) IF AGENT-TYPE is BH:
(d) Set r to r(REL|E)
(e) ELSE IF AGENT-TYPE  O:
(f) FORALL x set r(x) to r(x|E)
4. END.
Appendix B: details of the similation experiments
In this paper, we mainly present results from two simulation experiments that were
run in parallel for the BH and O models.
Both experiments systematically vary central parameters (for additional settings, cf.
A.3.1 and A.3.2) and involve variants, investigating BH, O, and fixed-trust agents. All
agents sequentially obtained 10 pieces of evidence. For every parameter combination,
this updating procedure was repeated 1000 times.
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B.1 Experiment 1—without prior knowledge
In Experiment 1 we varied the generative probability of H, Pobj (H  1), (i.e., the base
rate) using [0, 0.05,…, 0.95, 1] and the true reliability, Pobj (E |H), using [0, 0.05, …,
0.95, 1]. For each of the resulting 441 parameter combinations, 1000 model runs were
conducted.
B.2 Experiment 2—with some prior knowledge
Experiment 2 varied the parameters as in Experiment 1, but investigated what happens
if the agents have knowledge of base rate of H (without knowing the actual status of
H). Thus the prior b0(H) was set to the varied base rate, Pobj (H) with [0, 0.05, …,
0.95, 1]. Experiment 2 likewise involved 441,000 model runs.
B.3 Dependent variables
The recorded variables, associated with the parameter setting for each run, store infor-
mation on whether the hypothesis was actually true or false, the resulting subjective
belief and the resulting subjective reliability. After the simulation we aggregated
these values over agents with the same parameter combinations. From the dependent
variables, we calculate the Brier score as (in)accuracy measure; that is the squared
difference between an agent’s subjective belief and the true status of H (either 0 or 1),
(bt(H) − H)2.
B.4 Figures
Figure 5 shows for Experiment 1 the mean squared differences (inadequacy) the two
models and the fixed-trust agent (for an optimal agent who knows the true likelihood).
The results are aggregated over the reliabilities that turned out to be irrelevant here.
The surface plots in Fig. 6 compare mean trust (M[rt ]), after updating. The upper
panels show results for Experiment 1, the lower ones for Experiment 2, the left ones
for BH, and the right ones for O. Each panel shows results covering base rates, Pobj
(H), and objective reliabilities, Pobj (E |H).
The surface plots in Fig. 7 present for Experiment 2 mean beliefs, mean squared
differences, and variance of squared differences for BH, O and fixed-trust agents.
Finally, Fig. 8 shows the results of two additional simulations of the mean inaccuracy
(squared differences), exploring the same basic parameter space as in Experiment 1.
However, now results are shown either for data-blind agents (i.e., agents who do not
use data but base rate only) or optimal agents (who know the actual likelihood). See
main text for the interpretation of the figures.
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